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steady and whole perspective serves to correct Victorian instability and narrowness is so well known a part of Arnold's message that it hardly needs demonstration. And yet not all of Sophocles appears to Arnold so immediately useful. In what is surely one of the strangest local judgments Arnold ever made, he specifically, in the 1853 Preface, excludes the Antigone from modern pertinence:
What, then, it will be asked, are the ancients to be our sole models? the ancients with their comparatively narrow range of experience, and their widely different circumstances? Not, certainly, that which is narrow in the ancients, nor that in which we can no longer sympathise. An action like the action of the Antigone of Sophocles, which turns upon the conflict between the heroine's duty to her brother's corpse and that to the laws of her country, is no longer one in which it is possible that we should feel a deep interest.
(Preface, p. 12)
When we remember E. M. Forster's remark in Two Cheers for Democracy about the necessity of betraying the state before betraying a friend (much less a brother), when we recall how Kierkegaard in Either/Or meditates on the psychology of Antigone's pain as the single best example of "The Ancient Tragical Motive . . . Reflected in the Modern," or when we consider the antitotalitarian uses to which the Antigone mythos has been put in our time (preeminently by Jean Anouilh), Arnold seems downright perverse in excepting this play from Greek poetry's lasting appeal. And since this judgment appears in an essay that centrally affirms a major Victorian writer's classical values (the Preface is at any rate one of Arnold's most frequently anthologized pieces), his startling blindness here, if that is what it is, calls attention not only to itself but even more to the peculiar status of the Antigone in the nineteenth century. Arnold's animadversion and our puzzled response suggest that the play's action is especially problematical -and even that it may be, in a full Arnoldian sense, the most "interesting" classical foil against which a modern author's attitude toward the ancients may be gauged.
To explore this possibility we must place Arnold's assessment of the Antigone in at least a brief historical context. I therefore examine how the play has been viewed by a great theorist of tragedy in the generation preceding Arnold's (Hegel); by a critic and novelist who was Arnold's contemporary (George Eliot); and by . We can then turn to the new perspectives on Arnold's judgment that become available when it is seen within this frame.
If we concentrate on the character of Antigone, as Arnold's judgment asks us to do, we can find little that is outmoded in her defiance of Creon's order that she not bury her dead brother, a traitor to Thebes. Arnold considers her motive culturally dated because she believes that the soul of an unburied Polyneices would be condemned to wander restlessly along the banks of the Styx for a hundred years. But surely every age since that of Sophocles has quite naturally translated into its own terms the imperatives of family loyalty and religious duty that inspire Antigone. The morning mail, for instance, brings the latest issue of the New York Review of Books, with Caroline Blackwood's "Liverpool: Notes from Underground," a mordant account of the overflow of corpses stored in unrefrigcrated, disused warehouses during a gravediggers' strike in northern English towns. The "horrific last straw" in an ongoing process of national decay, this eerie and unexpected strike aroused feelings of outrage, a sense of violation. There is a general feeling that if one's society owes one nothing else at least it owes one the right to be decently buried. In a pub I heard a woman saying, "The bereaved can't stand the idea that the people that they've just lost are floating around rotting in warehouses."2 Even in our enlightened times, few tribes of the race can accept with equanimity the prospect of unburied kin. Moreover, Antigone's local conception of duty is accompanied by something even more universal than respect for one's dead: the extravagant egoism that colors her early words and grows increasingly insistent as it encounters the equally overbearing rigidity of her antagonist. ("Such orders they say the worthy Creon gives to you and me," she rages at Ismene, "yes, yes, I say to me-.")3 This towering willfulness is precisely the sort of hamartia that transcends historical limits and that would seem to constitute the Antigone's most obvious claim to ageless modernity.
But although Arnold does not mention it, a conceivable ground for the charge of obsolescence does exist in the bizarre hierarchy of family values that Antigone asserts in her bond to her brother. Deserted by the chorus, facing imminent death, stripped of all consolations, she retreats into a strict final ratio: for a husband she would not have done what she has done, nor would she have made the sacrifice for a child, but a brother makes an undeniable claim because "with my parents hid away in death, no brother, ever, could spring up for me." Husbands and children are replaceable; brothers, once one's parents are dead, are not (11. 904-20). Here, in the chilling formula of these much disputed lines,4 if anywhere in the play, we can find some justification for dismissing the action's modern appeal. But Antigone's reasoning has not struck every modern ear as particularly jarring. Almost the entire section of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind concerning Sittlichkeit 'ethical behavior'5 focuses on a discussion (though a maddeningly implicit one, in the usual fashion of the Phenomenology) of Antigone's logic. For about three pages, Hegel argues that the feminine has the highest intimation of the ethical life-but only insofar as the woman is a sister, that is, insofar as she is willing to acknowledge her highest duty to a brother, whether living or dead. Precisely because a woman's relationship to a husband, parents, or children is based on natural feelings and emotional dependence, ethical considerations tend to be secondary. An "unmixed intransitive form of relationship," in contrast, binds a brother and sister:
They are the same blood, which, however, in them has entered into a condition of stable equilibrium. They therefore stand in no such natural relation as husband and wife, they do not desire one another; nor have they given to one another, nor received from one another, this independence of individual being; they are free individualities with respect to each other. The feminine element, therefore, in the form of the sister, premonizes and foreshadows most completely the nature of ethical life (sittliches Wesen).
( Of course, in such speculation we no doubt give our personal twist to the critic's personal estimate. One can imagine, for instance, a biographical argument that would relate Arnold's dismissal of the Antigone to his shrinking from the impassioned, single-minded "Marguerite," the "daughter of France" with whom he probably had a liaison in Thun during the summers of 1848 and 1849. While rejecting the Antigone as obsolete in the 1853 Preface, Arnold had as a matter of fact treated the play in "Fragment of an Antigone," in The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems of 1849. Louis Bonnerot, the criticbiographer who has done the most with the Marguerite connection, has characterized that icy lyric in a way that cannot but relate it to Arnold's attempt to distance himself from a romantic attachment to the young woman, the impulse Bonnerot sees behind a good many of the early lyrics: "On sent, en lisant ce fragment, que l'auteur a remporte une victoire sur lui-meme, et que cette victoire, qui est le triomphe du classicisme, a consiste a rendre la passion plus pure, non a l'eteindre" 'One feels, in reading this fragment, that the author has won a victory over himself, and that this victory, which is the triumph of classicism, has consisted in rendering passion purer, not in extinguishing it' (my translation) .3 By the time of the 1853 Preface, so the hypothetical argument a la Bonnerot would continue, the passion had become so purified that it was completely transcended-or suppressed. Hence, the rejection of Antigone (and the Antigone) in a preface that more elaborately justifies the suppression of another dangerous romantic passion, the morbidity of Empedocles on Etna.
My own guess is that Arnold's denial of the Antigone's modern relevance more surely disguises an ideological judgment, the same bias that with even greater certainty Hegel's reading of the play masks in an opposing fashion. As the defender of stable community in its collective and corporate character, as the embattled polemicist of Culture and Anarchy with its trumpeting of the state as the means by which "the best that is said and thought in the world" can be widely dispersed, Arnold might be expected to have difficulties with a play that treats as heroic an individual's defiance of the state's claim to primacy. A statist like Hegel, instead of dismissing the play, accommodates its action not only to his ethical but also to his political assumptions. Before Hegel, tradition had seen the play-for so its title directs-as primarily about Antigone's obedience to the imperatives of a blood tie. His essential contribution to that tradition has been to divide the focus by raising the ethical status of Creon's public loyalties to the same level as Antigone's personal ones. Indeed, however much Hegel may admire Antigone's character and whatever his larger view of tragedy as the collision of two equal goods, he tips the balance in favor of the statist idea by alluding to those lines in the play (11. 450-52) in which Antigone's loyalty is said to be to "inferior" authorities, to "the underworld gods of Hades . . . the inner gods of feeling, love, and kinship, not the daylight gods of free, self-conscious national and political life" who elicit Creon's fidelity (Aesthetics, I, 464).
Arnold does not lean that far toward Creon's side in "Fragment of an Antigone," but he at least works for a balance. While the lyric praises Antigone's "obedience to the primal law/ Which consecrates the ties of blood," it also makes Haemon, counter to his Sophoclean original, defend Creon's harshness and justify Antigone's death, for "he at least by slaying her, / August laws doth mightily vindicate."36 This rationalization of Creon's behavior, a classical student of Arnold's classicism has argued, erroneously conflates a kerugma, Creon's extraordinary emergency decree unsupported by the tables of the law, with the veneration of the immortal laws proclaimed in the magnificent choric ode on the wonder of man (11. 332-72). As a result Antigone and Creon are both seen as partially right, and for this "confusion" Arnold was specifically indebted to Hegel, who had earlier sophisticated Creon's "law" in similar fashion.37 Whatever the validity of this critique, by the time of the 1853 Preface Arnold's need for august laws to calm the hectic passions (whether personal or ideological) had arguably become even more peremptory than it had been beforeand the disturbing ancient heroine had to be entombed anew, had to be buried once and for all.
Antigone's refusal to compromise a blood tie may, then, be an action in which we can no longer "feel a deep interest." More likely, it significantly anticipates Doing As One Likes, the anarchic self-assertion that Arnold attacks so vehemently in his analysis of the Victorian culture crisis. Thus, his singling out of the Antigone's obsolescence undoubtedly tells us more about Arnold's antipathy toward a rampant, community-threatening individualism than it does about Sophocles' play, surely one of the world's monuments of unaging intellect. That is precisely the bracing, the corrective function of a touchstone. And yet when we make a touchstone of the work Arnold regards as a kind of antitouchstone-as the exception proving the rule of the classical action's modernity-the relativism implicit in such counterjudgments calls into question, once again, the touchstone doctrine and the ideal of critical objectivity it is intended to perpetuate. Herbert H. Lehman College City University of New York New York, New York
